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1 Introduction
Banks are exposed to adverse movements in interest rates as rates on their long, fixed-term
assets are on average locked-in for longer than rates on their liabilities. When the general level
of interest rates rises, banks typically experience a loss in economic value as the value of assets
decreases more than the value of liabilities.
An important question in that context is to what extent realized interest rate risk exposure
– the gain or loss in bank economic capital due to movements in interest rates – affects bank
lending. This question is particularly relevant in the current environment of prolonged low
nominal interest rates in which banks have substantially increased their interest risk exposure
(Turner, 2013; SNB, 2014, 2015). For instance, findings by Hanson and Stein (2015) suggest
that, as nominal interest rates declined, banks have rebalanced their asset holdings towards
longer maturities in order to keep the overall yield of their portfolios from decreasing too much.
The theoretical literature on the transmission of monetary policy postulates that interest
rate risk exposure indeed makes bank lending more sensitive to changes in nominal interest
rates (Van den Heuvel, 2002, 2007). The postulated mechanism has the following intuition: If
nominal interest rates rise, the resulting loss depletes a bank’s economic capital and brings it
closer to regulatory or market requirements. In such a situation, the bank’s ability to restore
its required capital level by issuing new equity is limited, because equity issuances are costly
due to asymmetric information between existing and potential new shareholders (Myers and
Majluf, 1984; Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Myers, 2001). Consequently, the bank reduces its
lending in order to still comply with the capital requirements imposed by regulators or market
participants.
Empirically testing how realized interest rate risk exposure affects bank lending is difficult
for two reasons. First, the necessary information about interest rate sensitive balance sheet
positions and the corresponding repricing maturities is often unavailable. Second, detailed
information about the positions used for hedging against interest rate risk is typically not pub-
licly available. Hence, constructing a measure for individual interest rate risk exposure net of
hedging is often infeasible based on publicly available information.
In this paper, we address these issues by exploiting a quarterly panel data set comprising
supervisory information on Swiss banks between 2001Q2 and 2013Q3. The data set provides
us with an individual measure of interest rate risk exposure that directly relies on each bank’s
repricing maturity profile. In a supervisory survey, each bank reports its interest rate sensitive
cash flows separated by their repricing maturities, i.e. the remaining time period until the
interest rate on the underlying position is reset. The repricing mismatch implied by these
cash flows yields the individual measure of interest rate risk exposure. It corresponds to the
adjustment in the bank’s economic value in response to a permanent 1 percentage point (pp)
change in nominal interest rates over all maturities. A major advantage of this measure is that it
reflects individual interest rate risk exposure net of hedging, since a bank’s reported cash flows
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take eventual hedging positions into account.
We apply a dynamic panel data model that relates bank loan growth to interest rate risk
exposure and various individual and macroeconomic control variables. The model, inspired by
Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), enables us to estimate
the most important channels through which bank loan growth responds to changes in nominal
interest rates. It also allows us to estimate the sensitivity of this response to individual interest
rate risk exposure.
The analysis yields three main results. First, realized interest rate risk exposure affects
bank lending through its impact on economic capital. The estimated effects of a given shock
in interest rates are initially small and statistically insignificant but grow over the next four
quarters and eventually become highly significant. For instance, in response to a permanent
1 pp increase in nominal interest rates, the average bank in 2013Q3 would ceteris paribus
reduce its predicted quarter on quarter loan growth rate by 50 basis points (bp) immediately
after the shock and reduce its cumulative loan growth after one year by approximately 170
bp. An estimated 28% of the 170 bp reduction would be due to realized interest rate risk
exposure lowering the bank’s economic capital. These estimated effects are also economically
significant both in light of the recent increase in interest rate risk exposure and in comparison
to the average quarter on quarter loan growth rate which was roughly 95 bp over the sample
period or the cumulative loan growth after one year of around 380 bp.
Second, as the Swiss banks also have become more heterogeneous in their interest rate
risk exposure, the effect of a permanent 1 pp increase in nominal interest rates would differ
substantially across individual institutions. For example, if the average bank’s interest rate
risk exposure ceteris paribus corresponded to the 1st (3rd) quartile instead of the average, it
would reduce its quarter on quarter loan growth by 45 (60) bp immediately after the shock, and
reduce its cumulative loan growth after one year by approximately 140 (200) bp. In historical
comparison, levels of interest rate risk exposure in 2003Q1 would have seen the average bank
decrease its quarter on quarter loan growth by 45 bp immediately after the shock and reduce its
cumulative loan growth after one year by approximately 135 bp.
Third, bank lending seems to be mainly driven by capital rather than liquidity. In contrast to
changes in economic capital due to realized interest rate risk exposure, we find no evidence that
changes in excess liquidity significantly affects bank lending. This result reflects that liquidity
buffers were large and most banks did not experience any strains on liquidity over the sample
period.
We also used an augmented specification of the model to test whether realized gains and
losses in economic capital have asymmetric effects on bank lending. The point estimates sug-
gest that realized losses may have a larger effect than comparable realized gains, although the
difference is not statistically significant. Thus, the above results from our baseline model may
be interpreted as a lower bound for the effects of an increase in interest rates on bank lending,
given current average interest rate risk exposure.
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The results are relevant for policy. They indicate that taking into account the level of the
banks’ exposure to interest rate risk helps to better understand how changes in interest rates
affect bank loan growth. Importantly, our results suggest that individual bank loan growth
has become more sensitive to changes in interest rates than it used to be prior to the recent
increase in interest rate risk exposure. Although our estimates cannot be directly aggregated
as they are based on individual data and do not take eventual general equilibrium effects into
account, they suggest that a given upward shock in nominal interest rates would likely have a
bigger impact on bank lending than in past periods where the banks’ interest rate risk exposure
was lower. Moreover, the Swiss banks’ heterogeneity in interest rate risk exposure implies
that even a relatively small shock could already cause sizable economic losses at the most
exposed institutions that might lead them to largely curb their lending. Hence, changes in
nominal interest rates could have redistributive effects; especially if the banks’ interest rate risk
exposure differs across regions. Finally, the finding that capital matters more for bank loan
growth than liquidity is consistent with the observations of Kishan and Opiela (2000, 2006),
that a higher capitalized banking system can better shield its creditors from shocks in interest
rates. The question how these results can be integrated into policy making naturally follows
from our analysis but is beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper is primarily related to the existing empirical literature on bank lending. Its em-
pirical strategy is similar to a seminal paper by Kashyap and Stein (2000) which analyzed the
different transmission channels of monetary policy via the banking system. Bichsel and Perrez
(2005) investigated how monetary policy affected bank lending in Switzerland between 1996
and 2002. However, they did not explicitly take interest rate risk exposure into account as they
focused on the relative importance of capital and liquidity for bank lending. Gambacorta and
Mistrulli (2004) analyzed the transmission of monetary policy in Italy between 1992 and 2001.
In contrast to the former two papers, they included a supervisory measure of interest rate risk
exposure. As ours, their measure of interest rate risk exposure is also based on each bank’s
repricing maturity profile. However, it does not take an economic value point of view, as future
cash flows are not discounted to their present value. Even though they applied an estimator that
differs from ours, they also found that realized interest rate risk exposure has a strong effect on
bank lending.
More recent work that is closely related to ours is by Landier et al. (2013). They estimated
the impact of interest rate risk exposure of US bank holding companies on the transmission of
monetary policy between 1986 and 2011. Yet, their measure of interest rate risk exposure has
a different focus than ours: In contrast to our measure that is based on a supervisory survey
and takes each bank’s whole maturity profile into account, their measure is based on publicly
available data on each bank’s income statement and solely considers assets and liabilities that
reprice within one year. Their measure is a good proxy for the maturity mismatch only under
the assumption that assets and liabilities which reprice after more than a year have on average
a similar duration. In contrast to our results, Landier et al. (2013)’s findings imply that banks
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would on average benefit from increasing interest rates as their income gaps for maturities up
to one year are on average positive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
structure of the Swiss banking system and later describes the sample and variables we use in
the econometric analysis. Section 3 outlines the econometric analysis. It provides background
information on the main channels though which nominal interest rates can affect bank lending.
Subsequently, it explains the empirical model we apply to identify how individual interest rate
risk exposure affects bank lending. Lastly, it discusses how we discriminate between immediate
and long-run effects, and how we deal with the specific challenges related to dynamic panel
methods. Section 4 interprets the results and presents some robustness checks. Finally, section
5 concludes.
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2 Data and summary statistics
This section first provides some information on the structure of the Swiss banking system.
Subsequently, it discusses the sample and the variables we use in the econometric analysis.
2.1 Structure of the Swiss banking system
Table 1 summarizes the structure of the Swiss banking system. By the end of 2012, there
existed 297 banks in Switzerland with total assets amounting to roughly 3.597 trillion CHF.1
Table 1: Summary Statistics on the Swiss Banking System in 2012Q4
Category Number of Domestic Client Domestic Mortgage Total Domestic Total
Banks Loans Loans Loans Assets
Big Banks 2 62’395 252’147 314’542 2’183’512*
Domestically Focused Banks:
Cantonal Banks 24 47’718 289’823 337’541 482’278
Regional and Savings Banks 40 6’588 81’712 88’300 102’530
Cooperative of Raiffeisen Banks 1 7’605 135’599 143’204 164’670
Other Domestically Focused Banks 2 4’137 41’382 45’519 53’345
Other Banks 228 37’400 33’759 71’159 610’706
Banking System Total 297 165’843 834’422 1’000’265 3’597’041
Share of Big Banks 38% 30% 31% 60%
Share of Domestically Focused Banks 40% 66% 61% 22%
Notes : Figures are in millions of Swiss Francs. The category ‘total domestic loans’ includes all loans made to the real sector. The category
‘domestic client loans’ represents the difference between ‘total domestic loans’ and ‘domestic mortgage loans’ and mostly contains commercial
loans. The category ‘domestically focused banks’ comprises all banks excluding the two big banks that have (i) a share of domestic loans
to total assets that is greater than 50% and (ii) a volume of domestic loans of at least 280 million Swiss Francs. The term ‘domestic’ means
that the borrowers of client loans are domiciled in Switzerland, and the real estates serving as collateral for mortgage loans are located in
Switzerland.
Source : SNB website, annual reports for big bank assets∗ and internal data.
The different types of banks fit into three main categories. The first comprises the two big
banks, UBS and Credit Suisse. As internationally active universal banks, they offer a broad
range of services. The second main category consists of domestically focused banks. This
category contains all retail banks providing domestic loans to the real sector that amount to at
least 280 million CHF and make up at least half of their total assets. In 2012Q4, there were
24 mostly state-owned cantonal banks, 40 regional and savings banks, the cooperative of Raif-
feisen banks, and 2 other domestically focused banks in that category. The last main category,
labeled as ‘other banks’, is made up by a heterogeneous group of mostly small banks special-
ized in different business models, such as asset management, brokerage, and trade financing.
The Swiss banking system is highly concentrated. The two big banks account for just over
half of its total assets. Even though roughly two thirds of their business is abroad and a large
1 On December 31, 2012 the nominal exchange rate was 0.91 CHF per USD.
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proportion of their balance sheet consists of financial assets, the two big banks still reached a
combined market share of 31% in the market for domestic loans to the real sector in 2012Q4.
However, the domestically focused banks are the most important providers of domestic loans
to the real sector with a combined market share of 61% in 2012Q4 . The remaining 228 other
banks play only a minor role in domestic lending to the real sector and claimed a combined
market share of 8% in 2012Q4.
2.2 Sample and variables for the empirical analysis
For the empirical analysis, we build a data set that includes quarterly information on bank
lending, exposure to interest rate risk, capital, liquidity and balance sheet size collected from the
regular surveys conducted by the Swiss National Bank (SNB).2 Our sample comprises the two
big banks and the 67 domestically focused banks and covers the period between 2001Q2 and
2013Q3. We complement the information on bank-level data with macroeconomic variables
such as short- and long-term interest rates, inflation and real GDP growth.
2.2.1 Exposure to interest rate risk
Interest rate changes affect the underlying economic value of a bank’s assets, liabilities and
off-balance sheet instruments, due to adjustments in the discount rates used to determine the
present value of the respective future cash flows. As a consequence, the bank’s economic
capital - the difference between the present value of its incoming cash flows and its outgoing
cash flows - is affected by nominal interest rate movements.
Our measure of interest rate risk exposure is based on data collected from a comprehensive
supervisory survey conducted by the SNB on behalf of Switzerland’s microprudential supervi-
sor, the Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority (FINMA). The survey provides detailed
information on the repricing maturity profile of each bank i in every quarter t. Banks report, on
a quarterly frequency, all significant notional and interest rate cash flows arising from interest
rate sensitive positions in their banking book, plus the securities and precious metal trading
portfolio. Each cash flow is allocated to one of 18 time bands, according to its repricing matu-
rity defined in this context as the remaining time period until the interest rate on a position is
reset.3 Positions are differentiated, into three main categories, according to the nature of their
interest rate repricing maturities.4 The first contains all positions with a defined interest rate
repricing maturity, for example, fixed rate mortgages.5 The second category covers positions
2 A small number of banks only report certain variables biannually. We linearly interpolate those variables to obtain
quarterly observations.
3 The 18 bands are of different lengths. There are 7 time bands for repricing below 1 year: up to 1 day, 1 day to 1
month, 1 month to 2 months, 2 months to 3 months, 3 months to 6 months, 6 months to 9 months and 9 months to
1 year. There are 9 yearly time bands for maturities between 1 and 10 years. The longest times bands are 10 to 15
years and above 15 years.
4 A fourth category covers eligible capital, mostly made up of equity. We do not consider the cash flows of these
positions as we precisely want to measure the changes in economic capital.
5 A 10 year fixed-rate mortgage with yearly interest payments (without pre-payment option) issued five years and
one day before the current date is reported in the survey as follows: the notional cash flow and the most recent
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with undefined interest rate repricing maturities such as sight claims, claims against customers
and variable rate mortgage claims, on the assets side and sight liabilities and savings deposits
on the liabilities side. The third category regroups remaining position without or with arbitrary
interest rate repricing maturities. Cash flows of positions falling in the last two categories are
reported according to the banks’ internal assumptions on interest rate repricing maturities.
For each of the 18 time bands, m, the difference between incoming and outgoing cash flows
determines the net cash flow, CF (m)it. Based on these net cash flows, the bank’s interest rate
risk exposure, ρit, is given by:
ρit =
18∑
m=1
CF (m)it
[
DF (m)+1ppt −DF (m)t
]
, (1)
whereDF (m)t is the discount factor using the relevant risk-free interest rates for maturitym at
time t, and DF (m)+1ppt is the hypothetical discount factor following a 1 pp increase in interest
rates across all maturities.6 A positive net cash flow in time band m leads to a reduction in the
bank’s economic capital when interest rates increase. This is due to the fact that, for a given
time band m, the value of assets decreases more than that of liabilities. Hence, a bank that
typically extends loans with a repricing maturity exceeding that of its liabilities will experience
a decrease in the value of its equity when interest rates increase. Note that ρit reflects the bank’s
interest rate risk exposure net of hedging, because CF (m)it comprises all cash flows, including
those from linear hedging positions.
The measure of individual interest rate risk exposure, ρit, corresponds to the approximate
change in bank i’s economic capital that would be realized per pp the risk-free nominal yield
curve shifts upward. Hence, a parallel shift of the yield curve by ∆it+1 pp changes bank i’s
economic capital by approximately ρit × ∆it+1 CHF. To make the realized interest rate risk
exposure comparable across banks, we express it as a fraction of eligible capital,
ρit ×∆it+1
EligCit
. (2)
Figure 1 illustrates how the Swiss banks’ interest rate risk exposure evolved between 2001Q2
and 2013Q3. The orange line corresponds to the average realized interest rate risk exposure as
a fraction of eligible capital, that would have occurred in response to a 1 pp upward shift in
nominal interest rates. The shaded areas represent the various interpercentile ranges, along
with median levels (grey line), of interest rate risk exposure.
The Swiss banks substantially increased their interest rate risk exposure over the sample
period. In 2001Q2, they would on average have experienced an economic gain amounting
interest cash flow are reported in a time band corresponding to the residual maturity, ie. 4 to 5 years, and the
remaining yearly interest cash flows in four distinct time bands, i.e. 9 months to 1 year, 1 to 2 years, 2 to 3 years
and 3 to 4 years.
6 The measure is analogous for a decrease in nominal interest rates.
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Figure 1: Interest rate risk exposure of Swiss banks
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Correlation before 2008Q3 = 0.29 and correlation after 2008Q3 = −0.20
to 3.75% of eligible capital if nominal interest rates increased by 1 pp, i.e. on average their
liabilities had longer maturities than their assets. However, shortly after they started to increase
their interest rate risk exposure. By the end of 2008, they would have incurred an average
economic loss equivalent to about 4.25% of eligible capital in response to such a 1 pp increase
in nominal interest rates. Since then, their interest rate risk exposure has been roughly stable
on average but become more heterogeneous.
Nominal interest rates, represented by the 3 months LIBOR in red, also varied substantially
between 2001Q2 and 2013Q3. The overall correlation between the 3 months LIBOR and av-
erage bank interest rate risk exposure is positive. Note that the correlation before 2008Q3 is
positive but negative after 2008Q3. Thus, nominal interest rates and interest rate risk exposure
do not comove perfectly which helps us identify the effect of interest rate risk exposure on bank
loan growth.
2.2.2 Individual bank characteristics and macroeconomic variables
Table 2 presents summary statistics of all the variables in the sample. Its upper panel con-
tains individual bank characteristics, while its lower panel exhibits variables that proxy for the
macroeconomic environment and are common to all banks.
The most important individual bank characteristic is the realized interest rate risk exposure
as a fraction of eligible capital. We calculate it using equation (2) and proxy for the change
in nominal interest rates, ∆it+1, by the change in the 3 months LIBOR, ∆i3Mt+1. We later show
that our results remain robust if we use an alternative proxy for the change in nominal interest
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Individual Bank Variables:
Realized Interest Rate Risk Exposure (Fraction) 3317 -0.002 0.016 -0.119 0.146
as a fraction of eligible capital
Domestic Loan Growth Rate (QoQ %) 3394 0.936 1.047 -3.755 6.028
Excess Capital (Fraction) 3412 0.525 0.348 -0.872 2.043
Normalized Excess Capital - 3412 0.000 0.348 -1.396 1.519
Excess Liquidity (Fraction) 3414 0.849 0.675 -0.425 5.751
Normalized Excess Liquidity - 3414 0.000 0.675 -1.274 4.902
Log of Total Assets (Log) 3408 14.97 1.734 12.452 21.19
Normalized Log of Total Assets - 3408 0.000 1.727 -2.354 6.218
Macroeconomic Variables:
∆ Short-term interest rate (p.p.) 50 -0.068 0.312 -1.245 0.350
∆ Long-term interest rate (p.p.) 50 -0.046 0.251 -0.708 0.464
Inflation Rate (YoY %) 50 0.621 0.876 -1.019 2.975
Real GDP Growth Rate (YoY %) 50 1.687 1.767 -3.138 4.089
Notes : Loan growth is a non-annualised quarter on quarter growth rate. Excess measures are defined as
eligible minus required divided by required. Inflation and real GDP both represent annualised year on year
quarterly rates, i.e. percentage change with corresponding quarter in the previous year. The sample period
spans from 2001Q2 until 2013Q3 at a quarterly frequency. The panel data set is mildly unbalanced.
rates that also takes long term interest rates into account. Over the sample period, the realized
change in economic capital due to interest rate risk exposure was close to zero on average but
varied substantially over time and across banks.
The other individual bank characteristics are total domestic loans, excess capital, liquidity,
and total assets. Total domestic loans are made up of domestic client and mortgage loans.
They allow us to to calculate the quarter on quarter bank loan growth rate, which amounted to
roughly 0.95% on average over the sample period, or 3.80% when annualized. Excess capital
and liquidity correspond to the eligible minus the required amounts. To make them comparable
across banks, we report them as fractions of the required amounts. On average, capitalization
and liquidity exceeded the requirements by 52.5% and 84.9%, respectively. The high level of
excess liquidity reflects that most banks did not experience any strains on liquidity during the
sample period. We proxy for bank size by the log of total assets, which on average was 14.97.
To make excess capital, excess liquidity, and bank size easier to interpret in the econometric
analysis, we apply the following normalizations. We center excess capital and excess liquidity
on the entire sample mean, so that interaction terms involving these variables have an interpre-
tation with respect to the average bank in the sample. Similarly, we center bank size on the
sample average in each period to deal with its trending nature. We also account for outliers as
well as market entries and exits in the sample. For more detailed information on the handling
of outliers, the normalizations, and the treatment of market entries and exits, please refer to
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appendix A.1.
Finally, to proxy for the macroeconomic environment, we add the 3 month LIBOR on CHF,
the 10 year government bond yield, the inflation rate measured by the general consumer price
index, and the year on year growth rate of the real GDP to the sample.
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3 Empirical analysis
This section first reviews the conceptual background that provides the basis for the empirical
model. Second, it describes the specification of the empirical model that allows us to identify
the effects of interest rate risk exposure on bank lending. Later, it discusses how we differen-
tiate between immediate and long-run effects, and how we deal with the challenges arising in
dynamic panel data models.
3.1 Conceptual Background
In the empirical analysis we focus on isolating the effects of interest rate risk exposure on bank
lending. To do so, we have to partial out the other main channels through which changes in
nominal interest rate can affect bank lending.
A growing body of theoretical literature on the effects of monetary policy, originating from
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), has analyzed market imperfections that give rise to three main
channels through which changes in nominal interest rates can affect bank lending. A change
in nominal interest rates can filter through: (i) the Bank Capital Channel (BCC), (ii) the Bank
Lending Channel (BLC), and (iii) the Balance Sheet Channel (BSC). Each of these channels
relies on distinct market imperfections, that are amplified by individual bank or borrower char-
acteristics.
Our main focus lies on the BCC, which describes how a bank’s interest rate risk exposure
provides the grounds for interest rate changes to shift its lending. The wider its repricing
mismatch, the more exposed the bank is to interest rate risk, which increases the resulting loss
in economic capital it experiences when nominal interest rates rise, and eventually reduces
its lending. Van den Heuvel (2007) develops a detailed model of a bank’s asset and liability
management which incorporates capital requirements and an imperfect market assumption for
bank capital. In this model, the bank exhibits a maturity mismatch in its balance sheet, i.e. it
relies on short-term funding to finance long-term assets, and holds a capital buffer in excess
of regulatory or market requirements. If nominal interest rates rise, the bank experiences a
loss in economic capital, as the interest rates on its short-term funding adjust faster than on
its long-term assets. This economic loss depletes the bank’s capital buffer and brings it closer
to regulatory or market capital requirements. In this situation, the bank typically does not
issue new equity, as equity issuances are costly due to the asymmetric information between
the banks existing shareholders and potential future shareholders (see e.g. Myers and Majluf,
1984; Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Myers, 2001). The intuition is that existing shareholders and
the bank’s management know the economic value of the bank’s assets and only agree on issuing
new equity if the actual share price is overvalued. However, the potential future shareholders
anticipate this reasoning and are only willing to invest in newly issued equity at large discounts.
Cornett and Tehranian (1994) show empirically that issuing new equity can in fact be costly.
Consequently, instead of issuing new equity, the bank will cut back its loan supply in order
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to still comply with the capital requirements imposed by regulators or market participants.
Empirical work on Italian banks by Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) confirms that a wider
maturity mismatch leads to a stronger reaction of bank lending to changes in nominal interest
rates.
In contrast, the BLC describes how a bank’s liquidity levels determine how its loan schedule
will withstand changes to the banking system’s available reserves once interest rates change.
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) show with a standard IS/LM model, that the Fed’s draining of
reserves and hence insured deposits, reduces the banking system’s loanable funds, ultimately
decreasing the supply of bank loans. The BLC relies on the market imperfection that insured
deposits carry artificially low interest rates compared to other sources of short-term funding
that are not covered by deposit insurance. Thus, if a bank has to replace an outflow of insured
deposits by other sources of uninsured short-term funding, its funding costs increase, and so,
the bank reduces its loan supply. Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) provide empirical evidence
for the BLC. In particular, they find that changes in monetary policy matter more for lending
by small, less liquid banks.
Finally, the BSC by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) captures how raising nominal interest
rates affects bank lending via altered creditworthiness of borrowers. The borrowers’ credit-
worthiness deteriorates due to increased interest payments on outstanding variable rate debt.
Similarly, increasing interest rates are usually associated with decreasing asset value, which
erodes the borrowers’ collateral value. As a consequence, bank lending to these borrowers typ-
ically decreases, as agency costs, associated with monitoring or screening rise. Jiménez et al.
(2012) exploit an extensive data set on the universe of commercial loans granted by all banks
in Spain to study how bank lending to firms is affected by monetary policy. One main result
is that firms with weaker balance sheets and shorter creditworthy track records can rely less on
external financing.
In sum, both the BCC and BLC depend on individual bank characteristics. In contrast, just
like loan demand, the extent of the BSC mainly relies on individual borrower characteristics.
Therefore our empirical strategy aims at isolating the BCC – our main focus of interest – along
with the BLC. In contrast, it treats the BSC together with loan demand as one of the remaining
components of loan growth which we cannot further disentangle explicitly, as we do not observe
individual borrower characteristics.
3.2 Empirical model
We apply a dynamic panel data model of bank loan growth, inspired by Kashyap and Stein
(1995, 2000) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004). It allows us to estimate how interest rate
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changes affect bank loan growth. The model has the following specification:
∆ lnLit = β0 + α∆ lnLit−1
+
4∑
s=0
β1,s
(
ρit−1 ×∆i3Mt
EligCit−1
)
it−s
+
4∑
s=0
β2,sBit−1 ×∆i3Mt−s +
4∑
s=0
β3,sCit−1 ×∆i3Mt−s
+
4∑
s=0
β4,s ∆i
3M
t−s +
4∑
s=0
β5,s ∆i
10Y
t−s
+ β6Bit−1 + β7Cit−1 + β8 Sit−1
+
4∑
s=0
β9,sCit−1 × yt−s +
4∑
s=0
β10,s yt−s +
4∑
s=0
β11,s pit−s
+
4∑
s=2
θs + µi + it , (3)
with i = 1, ..., N banks and t = 5, ..., T quarters. The dependent variable, ∆ lnLit, is the first
difference of bank i’s log loan volume in quarter t. Hence it can be interpreted as the quarter on
quarter loan growth rate. Individual bank characteristics are all lagged by one quarter to avoid
simultaneity problems. Next, we explain the roles of the different regressors.
The model features one lag of the dependent variable among the regressors.7 This feature
has two benefits. First, the lagged dependent variable controls for unobserved characteristics of
bank i’s lending in the previous periods that impact loan growth in the current period. Second, it
allows for a dynamic response of the model, enabling us to differentiate between the immediate
and long-run effects of an interest rate change on bank loan growth.
The parameters β1,s identify the effect of realized interest rate risk exposure as a fraction
of eligible capital. Even though the change in economic capital has no immediate P&L effect
on regulatory capital, as it represents a change in the present value of future cash flows, the
bank is likely to anticipate the resulting future P&L effects and adjusts its loan supply with the
new information. This adjustment is in line with the BCC literature, which postulates that a
bank losing part of its capital will curb its lending because its capitalization gets closer to limits
imposed by regulators or market participants. Hence, we expect losses in economic capital
due to realized interest rate risk exposure to have a negative effect on bank lending. This
also implies that loan growth of higher exposed banks should be more sensitive to changes in
nominal interest rates.
The interaction terms of normalized excess liquidity, Bit−1×∆i3Mt−s, and normalized excess
7 We also implemented specifications with up to four lags. In each of these specifications, we tested the joint
significance of the additional lags. In all cases, the additional lags were never jointly significant. Furthermore,
partial autocorrelation analyses suggest that the first lag is the most relevant.
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capital, Cit−1 × ∆i3Mt−s, with the three months LIBOR, ∆i3Mt , have three interpretations. The
first interaction term controls for the notion that the loan supply of banks with larger liquid-
ity buffers should be more robust to a given change in nominal interest rates, as these banks
can cope longer with liquidity outflows before they have to tap into more expensive sources
of uninsured short-term funding. The interpretation of the second interaction term, however,
is two-fold. On the one hand, it captures that the “lemon’s premium”, i.e. the spread between
the costs of insured deposits versus other sources of uninsured short-term funding, is lower for
higher capitalized banks. On the other hand, an increase in interest rates generally worsens the
borrowers’ financial position and may result in higher future defaults, which would need to be
absorbed by the bank’s capital. If banks anticipate the higher future default rates, loan sup-
ply at higher capitalized banks will react less than at lower capitalized banks since regulatory
capital requirements are less binding for higher capitalized banks. The first two interpretations
correspond to the BLC, while the third is in line with the BSC. In sum, we expect both of these
interaction terms to have a positive effect on bank loan growth.
The specification also includes changes in the 3 months LIBOR, ∆i3Mt , which proxies for
movements in short-term rates along with changes in the 10 year government bond yield, ∆i10Yt ,
that proxies for movements in long-term rates. The combined inclusion of these proxies for
short- and long-term interest rates movements is useful given that our measure of interest rate
risk exposure considers a general change in nominal interest rates over all maturities.
We further include individual bank characteristics that account for bank-specific factors that
lead to heterogeneity in loan growth. First, the effect of normalized excess capital, Cit−1, on
loan growth is ambiguous. On the one hand, we expect prudent management to be associated
with high capital buffers and low loan growth. On the other hand, large capital buffers could
help expand loan growth by making uninsured short-term funding cheaper. Second, the effect
of normalized excess liquidity, Bit−1, on loan growth is ambiguous too for similar reasons.
Large stocks of liquidity may be a result of management moving to buffer up liquidity, which,
all else equal, mechanically decreases loan supply. Alternatively, large liquidity buffers may
also provide a pool of loan funding. Finally, normalized size, Sit−1, most likely has a negative
coefficient, as a given absolute increase in loan volume mechanically has a smaller effect on
the loan growth rate of large banks due to the bigger size of the existing loan base.
The specification additionally incorporates regressors that proxy for the economic environ-
ment. We expect the interaction between normalized excess capital and the real GDP growth
rate, Cit−1 × yt−s, to have a negative effect on loan growth, since more solvent banks are bet-
ter positioned to withstand economic downturns, resulting in a more stable credit supply. The
literature typically explains this by the fact that higher capitalized banks are more risk averse,
and lend ex ante to borrowers with lower probabilities of default (see for example Kwan and
Eisenbeis (1997)). The real GDP growth rate, yt, captures changes in loan demand due to the
business cycle, while the CPI inflation rate, pit, explains the part of loan growth which is simply
due to larger nominal loan values.
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Finally, we allow for individual bank fixed effects, µi, which remain invariant over time
and are unique to bank i. These individual bank fixed effects absorb any potential effects of
time-invariant individual characteristics of the banks that influence loan growth. In addition,
we include quarter dummies, θj , to capture seasonality in bank loan growth.
3.3 Immediate and long-run effects
The dynamics that result from including the lagged dependent variable in equation (3) allow us
to distinguish between immediate and long-run effects of the regressors on bank loan growth.
The long-run effect of a regressor corresponds to its total cumulative impact over time under
the ceteris paribus assumption that no adjustment in other variables, besides bank loan growth,
takes place.
The estimate of the immediate effect of the j-th regressor directly follows from its most
contemporaneous coefficient. In contrast, the estimate of its long-run effect is given by∑4
s=0 βˆj,s
(1− αˆ) , (4)
i.e. by summing up all the coefficients associated with the j-th regressor and dividing by
one minus the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable.8 Notice that comparing the two
estimates sheds light on how much of the effect of a given shock takes place immediately upon
impact.
3.4 Estimation
The estimation of dynamic panel data models may suffer from endogeneity bias due to the
inclusion of lagged dependent variables among the regressors. Consider the following stylized
version of our model:
yit = αyit−1 + βxit + (µi + it) , |α| < 1 , (5)
for i = 1, ..., N and t = 2, ..., T .
A pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of (5) generates an upward biased es-
timate on the α coefficient. This upward bias results from the positive correlation between the
lagged dependent variable, yit−1, and the individual fixed effect, µi, in the composite error term.
Similarly, the within groups fixed effects estimator (WG) mechanically introduces a down-
ward bias on the α coefficient. This downward bias is a consequence of the negative correlation
of order 1/(T − 1) between the transformed lagged dependent variable, y˜it−1, and the trans-
formed error term, ˜it. The literature refers to this bias as “Nickell Bias” (Nickell, 1981).
The standard way to deal with this endogeneity problem is by implementing a Generalised
8 Versions with further lagged dependent variables would take the following form:
∑4
s=0 βˆj,s
(1−∑rs=1 αˆs) , where r is the
number of lags.
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Method of Moments (GMM) approach developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and extended
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Essentially, this GMM approach
eliminates the fixed effects using a differenced equation and instruments the resulting equation
with internal lagged level versions of the equation’s variables in order to alleviate the endogene-
ity bias. Ultimately, GMM estimates of α should fall in between the OLS and WG estimates.
Note, however, that the “Nickell Bias” of the WG estimator becomes negligible when the
time dimension of the panel is sufficiently large.9 The correlation is non-negligible for panels
with a small T , but becomes negligible as T increases. Excluding the additional explanatory
variables, the “Nickell Bias” is given by (Nickell, 1981):
plim
N→∞
(αˆ− α) ' −(1 + α)
T − 1 . (6)
Therefore, a larger time dimension reduces the extent of the bias. A more general result includ-
ing explanatory variables follows naturally.
Simulation studies reveal that the “Nickell Bias” becomes negligible for T > 30 (Bruno,
2005; Judson and Owen, 1999; Kiviet, 1995). In addition, any bias on the estimates of explana-
tory variable coefficients depends on the relation of the explanatory variables with the lagged
dependent variable but remains slight in comparison.
Given the results of these simulation studies and the large time dimension of our panel, i.e.
T = 50, we can safely rely on the WG estimator as the “Nickell Bias” gets negligible. Us-
ing the WG estimator instead of GMM estimator has two advantages. First the WG estimator
is generally more efficient in practice (Arellano and Honoré, 2001; Kiviet, 1995; Alvarez and
Arellano, 2003). Second, we can avoid making somewhat arbitrary choices about the instru-
ment’s specific structure and the number of lags that would be necessary when implementing
the GMM estimator.
Table A2 in the appendix shows the coefficients of our model estimated using OLS, WG,
and different versions of GMM. It confirms that the WG and GMM estimators yield similar
results, and that the WG estimator tends to be more efficient. Consequently, all results in the
following section are based on the WG estimator.
9 Alvarez and Arellano (2003) show that, under certain conditions, the WG estimator has the distribution√
NT
[
αˆ− (α− 1T (1 + α))] d→ N(0, 1− α2). Large time dimensions reduce the bias 1T (1 + α).
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4 Results
This section first presents evidence on the importance of the different channels through which
changes in nominal interest rates affect bank loan growth. Subsequently, it discusses the impact
of realized rate risk exposure on bank loan growth. In addition, it explores whether the effects
of gains and losses due to realized interest rate risk exposure are different in absolute terms.
Finally, it summarizes the results of four robustness checks.
4.1 Effect of interest rate changes on bank loan growth
Table 3 exhibits the estimated effects of the different channels through which changes in nomi-
nal interest rates may affect bank loan growth. For a given change in nominal interest rates, ∆i,
the first column shows the immediate effects, while the second column contains the long-run
effects under the assumption that no adjustment takes place in other variables apart from bank
loan growth. The long-run estimates can be interpreted as approximate cumulative effects over
the next year, since the weights of future periods decline at a geometric rate and any period
after four quarters in the future has an almost negligible weight.
Table 3: Immediate vs. Long-run Effects
Variables Immediate Long-Run
Realized Interest Rate Risk Exposure
(
ρit−1×∆i3Mt
EligCit−1
)
2.02 11.51***
as a fraction of eligible capital (2.03) (3.32)
Norm. Excess Liquidity × ∆i3M –0.07 –0.08
(0.11) (0.15)
Norm. Excess Capital × ∆i3M –0.08 –0.48
(0.25) (0.90)
∆ Short-term interest rate (∆i3M) –0.38** –1.09**
(0.17) (0.45)
∆ Long-term interest rate (∆i10Y ) –0.07 –0.23
(0.08) (0.31)
Notes : Dependent variable is the first difference of log quarterly loan volume, i.e. ap-
proximately the quarter on quarter loan growth rate. Estimates using the Within Groups
transformation in Table A2. All standard errors, in parentheses, are cluster robust at
a bank-merger level. Immediate effect standard errors are simply regression estimates.
Long-run effect standard errors are calculated using the delta-method. The long-run ef-
fects work under the assumption that no adjustment takes place in other variables apart
from bank loan growth. In addition, the long-run estimates can be interpreted as approxi-
mate cumulative effects over the next year. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The estimates in the first row indicate that changes in nominal interest rates affect bank
loan growth to a large extent through the effect of realized interest rate risk exposure on eco-
nomic capital. The corresponding long-run effect is statistically highly significant, while the
immediate effect is insignificant. This result is consistent with the intuition that anticipated
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losses in economic capital alter bank lending in future periods. To get a first interpretation
of the magnitude of the effect, consider how a 1 pp upward shift in nominal interest rates af-
fects two hypothetical banks, A and B, that only differ in interest rate risk exposure. Bank
A would experience an economic loss equivalent to 5% of its eligible capital if interest rates
rise by 1 pp over all maturities, i.e. ρAt/EligCAt−1 = −5%. Bank B, on the other hand, is
relatively more exposed and the economic loss would amount to 6% of its eligible capital, i.e.
ρBt/EligCBt−1 = −6%.10 The estimated coefficients indicate, that bankB’s quarter on quarter
loan growth would be lower by −0.05 − (−0.06) × 1 pp × 2.02 = 2.02 bp than A’s imme-
diately after the shock, and its cumulative loan growth after one year would be approximately
−0.05− (−0.06)× 1 pp× 11.51 = 11.51 bp lower. Hence, we find evidence for a strong BCC
in Switzerland that is driven by realized interest rate risk exposure.
In contrast, changes in nominal interest rates have no significant effect on bank loan growth
via the levels of excess liquidity or excess capital. Hence we find neither evidence for a BLC,
acting through excess liquidity and the bank’s “lemon’s premium”, nor for a BSC, acting
through higher anticipated default rates. An explanation for the absence of a BLC and BSC
in our data may be that, over the sample period from 2001Q2 to 2013Q3, the vast majority of
Swiss banks did not experience any strains on liquidity and Switzerland’s real economy was
stable, so that defaults among borrowers were relatively rare. Moreover, many cantonal banks
enjoy implicit or explicit state guarantees that may render the “lemon’s premium” they have to
pay for uninsured short-term funding small and irresponsive to their level of excess capital.
Finally, the direct impact of both the short- and long-term interest rates on bank loan growth
capture the remaining supply and demand effects, which we cannot further disentangle. The co-
efficients on the short-term interest rates are large in absolute value and significant, while those
on the long-term interest rates remain smaller in absolute value and statistically insignificant.
4.2 Ceteris paribus effect of interest rate risk exposure
We now explore in more detail the extent to which interest rate risk exposure affects the sen-
sitivity of bank loan growth to movements in nominal interest rates. In particular, we analyze
the ceteris paribus effect of interest rate risk exposure for a permanent 1 pp increase in nominal
interest rates over all maturities on the average bank in the sample.
The solid black line in Figure 2 represents the predicted change in the average bank’s cu-
mulative loan growth in response to such a permanent 1 pp increase in nominal interest rates
happening at time t.11 To predict the immediate effect, i.e. in t, we take the model’s most con-
temporaneous coefficients and evaluate equation (3)’s derivative with respect to ∆it = ∆i3Mt =
∆i10Yt = 1 pp at the average bank’s characteristics in time t.
12 To predict how the effect evolves
10 Note that the same result could also be obtained by holding interest rate risk exposure constant, ρAt = ρBt, but
assuming different levels of eligible capital between A and B. However, different levels of eligible capital would
also affect other characteristics of the mode in equation (3).
11 Time t refers to the last available period in our sample, i.e. 2013Q3.
12 Calculation details can be found in appendix A.3.
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Figure 2: Cumulative effect of a permanent 1 percentage point upward shock in nominal
interest rates on bank loan growth
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Calculation details can be found in appendix A.3.
over the subsequent quarters, i.e. over t + s, s = 1 . . . 4, we have to take the dynamics of the
model into account as described in appendix A.3.
The dashed lines in Figure 2 illustrate the ceteris paribus effect of interest rate risk exposure.
They correspond to the predicted response of the average bank’s cumulative loan growth to the
permanent 1 pp increase in nominal interest rates, assuming that its interest rate risk exposure
equals the 1st and 3rd quartile, respectively, while keeping all other characteristics constant.
Consequently, the dashed lines represent the average bank’s predicted reaction to the interest
rate increase, if it had an interest rate risk exposure corresponding to 1st and 3rd quartile,
respectively.13
Comparing the solid and dashed lines in Figure 2 reveals that interest rate risk exposure
has a substantial impact on the sensitivity of bank loan growth. Immediately after the 1 pp
shock in nominal interest rates, the predicted decline in quarterly loan growth amounts to 50
bp for the average bank in the sample. However, if, ceteris paribus, this bank had an interest
risk exposure equal to the 1st or 3rd quartile, respectively, the predicted decline would instead
amount to 45 bp and 60 bp. In the long-run, the impact of interest rate risk exposure gets even
bigger, as the widening spread between the dashed lines illustrates. A year after the shock,
i.e. in t + 4, the cumulative predicted decline in the average bank’s loan growth is 170 bp.14
13 Appendix A.7 contains individual figures including the 95% prediction intervals.
14 Remember that the total impact over time works under the ceteris paribus assumption that no adjustment in other
variables, besides bank loan growth, takes place.
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A decomposition of this predicted decline illustrates that roughly 28% of the decline is due to
realized interest rate risk. In comparison, for an interest rate risk exposure equal to the 1st or
3rd quartile respectively, the total predicted decline would, ceteris paribus, amount to 140 bp or
200 bp. In these cases, the contribution of interest rate risk exposure to the predicted declines
amounts to 11% and 40% respectively.
The substantial impact and vast heterogeneity of interest risk exposure indicate that the
decline in loan growth following an interest rate shock would not only be large in magnitude but
also vary greatly across banks. In particular, if nominal interest rates were to increase suddenly,
we expect the highly exposed banks in the sample to cut back their lending substantially more
than the average bank.
4.3 Differences in the effects of gains and losses
The results presented in Table 3 rely on the assumption that gains and losses in economic capital
due to realized interest rate risk exposure have a symmetric effect on bank loan growth. How-
ever, this assumption may not be met in reality, especially since short-term nominal interest
rates have approached the zero lower bound, even venturing into negative rates. To test for po-
tential asymmetries in the effects of gains and losses, we estimated an augmented specification
of our model. We included a dummy variable that allows the realized interest rate risk expo-
sure as a fraction of eligible capital to have a different effect on bank loan growth depending
on whether the exposure lead to a gain or a loss. (See appendix A.4 for further details).
Table 4: Asymmetry of Interest Rate Exposure
Variables Immediate Long-Run
Realized Interest Rate Risk Exposure
(
ρit−1×∆i3Mt
EligCit−1
)
:
as a fraction of eligible capital
Gain 0.79 9.57
(2.29) (5.75)
Loss 4.13 15.60**
(4.37) (6.40)
Two-sided test for equal coefficients (p-value):
H0: Gains = Losses 0.50 0.54
Ha: Gains 6= Losses
Notes : Dependent variable is the first difference of log quarterly loan volume, i.e. ap-
proximately the quarter on quarter loan growth rate. Estimates using the Within Groups
transformation. All standard errors, in parentheses, are cluster robust at a bank-merger
level. Immediate effect standard errors are simply regression estimates. Long-run effect
standard errors are calculated using the delta-method. The long-run effects work under the
assumption that no adjustment takes place in other variables apart from bank loan growth.
In addition, the long-run estimates can be interpreted as approximate cumulative effects
over the next year. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4 summarizes the results. The point estimates suggest that realized losses may have a
larger impact on bank loan growth than realized gains. In comparison to the coefficients of the
baseline model, reported in Table 3, the estimated long-run effect of realized losses is roughly
30% higher. These results suggest that upward shocks in nominal interest rates that typically
lead to economic losses given the observed exposures likely have a larger effect on bank lending
than comparable downward shocks that typically lead to economic gains. However, since the
difference between the estimated effects of realized gains and losses in economic capital are far
from being statistically significant, we stick with the baseline model and interpret its estimates
as a lower bound for the effects of realized interest rate risk on bank lending.
4.4 Robustness Checks
This subsection presents four main robustness checks. First, we use an alternative measure for
the change in nominal interest rates to calculate the realized change in economic capital due
to interest rate risk exposure. Second, we check whether the results remain robust when we
exclude the two big banks from the sample. Third, we assess whether the unbalanced nature
of the panel influences the results. Finally, in the fourth robustness check, we exclude the first
seven quarters during which the average bank’s interest rate risk exposure was positive.
4.4.1 Alternative proxy for the change in nominal interest rates
In the baseline specification, we use the change in the 3 months LIBOR to determine the real-
ized change in economic capital due to interest rate risk exposure. Hence, we implicitly assume
that changes in short-term rates convey the necessary information for calculating the realized
interest rate risk exposure. We now relax this assumption and alternatively proxy for the change
in nominal interest rates by the average change between the 3 months LIBOR and 10 year gov-
ernment bond yield, ∆iavgt . To check whether our results remain robust, we reestimate the
empirical model using the resulting alternative definition of realized interest rate risk exposure
as a fraction of eligible capital,
ρit−1 ×∆iavgt
EligCit−1
. (7)
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Table 5: Robustness – Alternative Interest Rate Measure
Variables Immediate Long-Run
Realized Interest Rate Risk Exposure
(
ρit−1×∆iavgt
EligCit−1
)
0.80 14.02***
as a fraction of eligible capital (2.09) (4.00)
Norm. Excess Liquidity × ∆i3M –0.07 –0.08
(0.11) (0.15)
Norm. Excess Capital × ∆i3M –0.06 –0.43
(0.25) (0.90)
∆ Short-term interest rate (∆i3M) –0.39** –1.05**
(0.15) (0.44)
∆ Long-term interest rate (∆i10Y ) –0.04 –0.02
(0.09) (0.32)
Notes : Dependent variable is the first difference of log quarterly loan volume, i.e. ap-
proximately the quarter on quarter loan growth rate. Estimates using the Within Groups
transformation. All standard errors, in parentheses, are cluster robust at a bank-merger
level. Immediate effect standard errors are simply regression estimates. Long-run effect
standard errors are calculated using the delta-method. The long-run effects work under the
assumption that no adjustment takes place in other variables apart from bank loan growth.
In addition, the long-run estimates can be interpreted as approximate cumulative effects
over the next year. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 5 shows that the results remain robust. Even though the point estimates suggest a
slight shift of focus from the immediate effect towards the long-run effect, they are not signifi-
cantly different from the estimates of the baseline model reported in Table 3.
We repeat the ceteris paribus analysis of the effect of interest rate risk exposure found in
section 4.2, but use the estimated coefficients from Table 5. The results indicate that immedi-
ately after a 1 pp shock in nominal interest rates, the predicted decline in quarter on quarter
loan growth amounts to 46 bp for the average bank in the sample. A year after the shock, i.e. in
t + 4, the cumulative predicted decline in the average bank’s loan growth would be 155 bp. In
this case, the decomposition of this predicted decline illustrates that roughly 38% of the decline
is due to realized interest rate risk.
4.4.2 Excluding the two big banks from the sample
The baseline estimation uses the sample which includes the two big banks along with the do-
mestically focused banks. On the one hand, including the big banks provides a more complete
picture of the Swiss banking system. But on the other hand, it is problematic due to the big
banks’ international business models and specific reporting requirements. In particular, the fol-
lowing two issues compromise the quality of our measure of interest rate risk exposure for the
two big banks.
First, about two thirds of the two big bank’s business is located abroad. This affects both
the numerator and the denominator of the measure of interest rate risk exposure ρit. In the
numerator, our measure probably overestimates the effect of a change in CHF interest rates on
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the big banks’ economic capital, as it neglects that most of the big banks’ cash flows are in
foreign currencies. Similarly, in the denominator, our measure likely overestimates the amount
of eligible capital the big banks attribute to domestic lending.
Second, since the measure ρit relies on the repricing mismatch between assets and liabili-
ties, it is an adequate measure for interest rate risk arising from the banking book. However, in
contrast to the domestically focused banks, the two big banks both have a substantial trading
book for which the repricing mismatch is a less adequate measure of interest rate risk.
Table 6: Robustness – Without Big Banks
Variables Immediate Long-Run
Realized Interest Rate Risk Exposure
(
ρit−1×∆i3Mt
EligCit−1
)
2.65 11.96***
as a fraction of eligible capital (2.00) (3.18)
Norm. Excess Liquidity × ∆i3M –0.07 –0.07
(0.11) (0.14)
Norm. Excess Capital × ∆i3M –0.12 –0.21
(0.27) (0.92)
∆ Short-term interest rate (∆i3M) –0.36** –1.34***
(0.16) (0.45)
∆ Long-term interest rate (∆i10Y ) –0.07 –0.27
(0.09) (0.31)
Notes : Dependent variable is the first difference of log quarterly loan volume, i.e. ap-
proximately the quarter on quarter loan growth rate. Estimates using the Within Groups
transformation. All standard errors, in parentheses, are cluster robust at a bank-merger
level. Immediate effect standard errors are simply regression estimates. Long-run effect
standard errors are calculated using the delta-method. The long-run effects work under the
assumption that no adjustment takes place in other variables apart from bank loan growth.
In addition, the long-run estimates can be interpreted as approximate cumulative effects
over the next year. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In light of these issues, we excluded the big banks from the sample and re-estimated our
baseline model. As Table 6 reveals, the estimates we obtain are virtually identical to the ones
shown in Table 3. Consequently, the two big banks have only a negligible impact on our results.
4.4.3 Assessing the influence of the unbalanced panel data
Another concern could be that the unbalanced nature of the panel data set influences the results.
Although the sample period from 2001Q2 to 2013Q3 covers T = 50 quarters, we only observe
62 banks over the whole period.15 Another 8 banks either left – mainly due to mergers and
acquisitions – or newly entered the sample between 2001Q2 and 2013Q3. To check whether
the unbalanced nature of the panel data set has an influence on the results, we re-estimated our
model including only banks which we observe for at least 10, 15, and 20 periods. As shown in
15 24 Cantonal, 33 regional and savings banks, Raiffeisen Group banks, Bank Coop, Bank Migros and the two big
banks.
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Table A5 in the appendix, the results remain robust.
4.4.4 Excluding quarters with positive interest rate risk exposure
In the first seven quarters of the sample, i.e. from 2001Q2 to 2002Q4, the banks were on
average positively exposed to upward interest rate shocks, meaning that they would have ex-
perienced an economic gain if nominal interest rates increased. This period of positive interest
rate risk exposure is unusual and may reflect that, due to flat yield curves, typical maturity
transformation was no longer as beneficial. As a result, asset duration was reduced culminating
in positive exposure to upward interest rate shocks. To check whether our results remain robust,
we excluded these seven quarters from the sample and re-estimated our baseline model on the
restricted sample period from 2003Q1 to 2013Q3.
We find that the coefficients on the impact of realized interest rate risk exposure on bank
lending remain robust, although they are estimated less precisely. The other coefficients are ro-
bust too, with the exception that the estimated direct effect of short-term interest rates becomes
significantly larger in absolute terms. Consequently, the estimated total effect of a permanent
change in nominal interest rates on bank lending is larger in the restricted sample, but the es-
timated effect of realized interest rate risk exposure remains virtually unchanged. Detailed
results can be found in Table A.6 in the appendix.
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5 Conclusion
Our results are policy relevant in various ways. First of all, they indicate that the level of banks’
exposure to interest rate risk needs to be taken into account when trying to understand how
changes in interest rates affect bank loan growth. Our results suggest that individual bank loan
growth has likely become more sensitive to changes in interest rates than it used to be prior to
the recent increase in interest rate risk exposure. Even though our estimates cannot be directly
aggregated as they are based on individual data and do not take eventual general equilibrium
effects into account, they still indicate that a given upward shock in nominal interest rates would
probably have a greater effect on bank lending in Switzerland today than experience prior to the
recent increase in interest rate risk exposure suggests. Furthermore, as the Swiss banks have
become more heterogeneous in interest rate risk exposure, even a relatively small shock could
already cause substantial losses in economic capital at the most exposed institutions, and lead
them to significantly cut back their lending. In parallel, if interest rate risk is heterogeneous
across regions, an interest rate shock may have redistributive effects. Finally, the finding that
bank lending is mainly driven by capital rather than liquidity suggests that larger capital buffers
would make bank lending more resilient against shocks in nominal interest rates, while larger
liquidity buffers would only have a relatively small or even no effect. Similar conclusions are
drawn in recent work published in BIS (2015).
However, a few limitations regarding our measure of interest rate risk are in order here. It is
exclusively based on the loss in economic capital due to banks’ repricing mismatches. Thus it
ignores that, in the current environment of negative short-term interest rates, an upward shock
in nominal interest rates would benefit the banks in two ways: They would have to pay less
negative interest rates on their sight deposit accounts at the SNB and, at the same time, their
liability margin would be restored.16 These two effects could at least partly offset the economic
loss arising from repricing mismatches. On the other hand, our measure may underestimate
the banks’ true exposure to interest rate risk, as their assumptions regarding positions with
undefined repricing maturities may be too optimistic; especially if the shock is substantial, and
interest rates on deposits need to be adjusted faster than expected.
Finally, there is scope for future research. An important open question is how changes in
the maturity of bank lending affects the transmission of monetary policy. On the one hand,
our results suggest that increased interest rate risk exposure renders bank lending to the real
sector more sensitive to changes in nominal interest rates. But on the other hand, increased
repricing maturity of loans at the origin of increased interest rate risk exposure also temporar-
ily shields existing borrowers from changes in interest rates. Furthermore, as loan-level data
16 The liability margin is the difference between the alternative funding costs for the corresponding maturity on the
capital market and the interest paid on the actual liability. It recently became negative for most banks. After
the introduction of negative interests on sight deposits at the SNB, some capital and money market interest rates
became negative too, while the interest rates on customer sight and savings deposits remained close to zero but
positive (SNB, 2015).
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becomes more readily available, accounting for borrower characteristics that fall under the bal-
ance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission should become possible. In summary, our
results should prove helpful for better understanding the transmission of monetary policy via
the banking system. As such our results constitute only a first step towards the integration
of banking sector characteristics into policy making, an important question that is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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A Appendices
A.1 Data preparation
A.1.1 Outliers
We deal with outliers in the loan growth series using the hadimvo STATA program with a
threshold at 0.01. Essentially, it removes the observations in the tails of the distribution, drop-
ping 30 observations out of 3444 observations. We keep the remaining outlier-free series of
bank loan growth for the analysis.
A.1.2 Normalizations
The normalizations, on the outlier-free data, to excess capital, liquidity and size work as fol-
lows. Formally excess capital and liquidity are given by
Xit =
EXit
RXit
−
(∑
t
∑
iE
X
it /R
X
it
Nt
)
/T ,
where X is either C for capital or B for liquidity and EX and RX are excess and required
quantities respectively. Hence, we subtract the sample average from excess capital and liquidity,
which yields a variable centered around zero. It should be interpreted as whether the bank had
more or less of the corresponding excess quantity in a given quarter than the average over all
banks and over the whole sample period.
Size is normalized with respect to the sample average in each period, which removes the
trending nature of the size variable. We adopt the following measure:
Sit = Sizeit −
(∑
i Sizeit
Nt
)
A.1.3 Mergers and acquisistions
We need to account for the discrete jumps that are created by 25 mergers and acquisition’s in
our data set during the sample period. The underlying method works as follows: (i) identify the
banks that perform a merger and acquisition as well as the banks that are subject to a merger
and acquisition in a given quarter; (ii) under the assumption that the acquired/absorbed banks
cease to exist in the quarter of the transaction, we remove all observations of those banks from
transaction onwards (and including the quarter of the transaction) but this only happens in
one case; and (iii) concerning the acquiring bank, we allocate it a new id from the quarter of
the transaction onwards. This procedure accommodates the Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004)
approach, and generates a so-called merger-id which we use to account for bank-level fixed
effects in our estimations. Note, we also used original bank id’s as fixed effects in a robustness
check (note presented here) and the results remained practically unchanged.
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In terms of entries and exits of banks during the sample, we start with 77 banks in 2001Q2
and end with 69 banks in 2013Q3. The majority of the fluctuation is due to a consolidation of
the banking system via mergers and accuqisitons that occurred over the sample period. There
is no systematic exit of banks or entry for that matter.
A.2 Estimator comparisons
Table A2 shows the OLS, WG, and GMM estimates of the model presented in equation (3).
Its main objective is to study whether the estimates change across the different estimators as
expected given the discussion in section 3.4.
The first two columns depicts the OLS and WG estimates, respectively. The subsequent
columns 3 to 6 show the estimates of different implementations of the GMM estimator that are
typically found in settings with dynamic panel models. The optimal implementation of the one-
step System GMM estimator depends on various criteria, namely: (i) the equation structure, (ii)
the choice of instrument structure17, (iii) the number of instruments18, (iv) the lack of second
order autocorrelation in the errors, and (v) over-identification tests. Columns 3 and 4 exploit the
GMM-style instruments that creates an instrument matrix, in which one column is generated
for each time period and lag available. In contrast, columns 5 and 6 use the so-called “stacked”
instruments, which is a reduced column format of the GMM-style instrument structure.
Points (ii) and (iii) are important in determining how the GMM estimator deals with the
“Nickell Bias.” More specifically, the GMM-style instrument structure takes on the following
form: 
0 0 0 0 0 0 . . .
yi1 0 0 0 0 0 . . .
0 yi2 yi1 0 0 0 . . .
0 0 0 yi3 yi2 yi1 . . .
...
...
...
...
...
... . . .

.
Each column is generated, for a given row, so that it contains the information of each lag that is
available in that period. In contrast, the stacked instrument structure greatly reduces the number
of columns that are generate and can be represented as follows:
0 0 0 . . .
yi1 0 0 . . .
yi2 yi1 0 . . .
yi3 yi2 yi1 . . .
...
...
... . . .

.
Therefore, choosing between GMM-style and stacked instruments can have a great influence
17 See Roodman (2009) for a detailed review on the topic.
18 See Blundell and Bond (1998); Bond (2002) for examples.
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on the number of instruments used in the estimation process.
Point (iv) investigates the autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic error term, it. First order
correlation would mean that lagged instruments starting at t − 2 would no longer be valid,
requiring the instruments to start at lag t − 3. First order autocorrelation in the differenced
errors (AR(1) p-value) is essentially uninformative due to the share of it−1 in both ∆it and
∆it−1, but should recover the mechanic negative correlation due to the differencing of the
levels equation in the GMM estimation process. Therefore, no first order autocorrelation in
levels is equivalent to no second order autocorrelation in differences, i.e. between it−1 in ∆it
and it−2 in ∆it−2. In all of the columns, results suggest that there is no first order correlation
(AR(2) p-value) in the level idiosyncratic errors. That said, we still account for the potential
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the errors at each bank by clustering the errors at a
bank level.
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Table A2: Estimated Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables OLS WG
GMM SYS t-2: GMM SYS t-3: GMM SYS t-2: GMM SYS t-3:
GMM-Style GMM-Style Stacked Stacked
Instruments Instruments Instruments Instruments
∆lnLit−1 0.466*** 0.330*** 0.445*** 0.506*** 0.379*** 0.504***
(0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.078)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it
1.487 2.020 1.437 2.882 -0.094 5.542
(2.159) (2.031) (2.172) (2.288) (3.517) (10.358)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it−1
1.962 2.171 1.910 0.820 3.272 -0.101
(2.841) (2.709) (2.769) (2.999) (3.299) (8.086)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it−2
-1.329 -1.189 -1.142 -1.026 0.904 2.868
(2.080) (1.953) (2.050) (2.095) (4.444) (5.134)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it−3
6.203*** 5.708*** 6.245*** 5.516*** 5.977*** 4.171
(1.569) (1.567) (1.547) (1.599) (2.097) (2.978)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it−4
-1.332 -0.995 -1.095 -1.495 -0.880 -1.147
(1.484) (1.550) (1.529) (1.501) (2.363) (2.565)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt -0.025 -0.071 -0.035 0.038 -0.250 0.224
(0.103) (0.106) (0.102) (0.117) (0.706) (0.736)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt−1 0.052 0.075 0.061 0.060 -0.277 -0.632
(0.163) (0.159) (0.162) (0.181) (0.714) (0.701)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt−2 0.056 0.067 0.057 0.060 -1.420* -0.952
(0.181) (0.174) (0.180) (0.210) (0.811) (0.848)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt−3 -0.032 -0.024 -0.025 -0.007 0.096 -0.158
(0.130) (0.118) (0.128) (0.160) (0.501) (0.491)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt−4 -0.109 -0.102 -0.108 -0.163 -0.348 -0.053
(0.088) (0.079) (0.086) (0.110) (0.464) (0.483)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt 0.116 -0.079 0.157 0.185 1.278 0.426
(0.242) (0.255) (0.237) (0.234) (1.604) (1.653)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt−1 0.154 0.112 0.143 0.170 0.911 0.869
(0.358) (0.348) (0.356) (0.366) (1.261) (1.591)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt−2 0.149 0.072 0.189 0.212 -0.306 -2.227
(0.344) (0.352) (0.328) (0.329) (1.588) (1.861)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt−3 0.005 0.038 -0.018 0.006 -1.858 -1.144
(0.214) (0.204) (0.217) (0.226) (1.171) (1.006)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt−4 -0.520* -0.466 -0.505* -0.506* 0.805 0.633
(0.289) (0.285) (0.296) (0.293) (1.011) (1.170)
Continued
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Table A2 cont’d: Estimated Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables OLS WG
GMM SYS t-2: GMM SYS t-3: GMM SYS t-2: GMM SYS t-3:
GMM-Style GMM-Style Stacked Stacked
Instruments Instruments Instruments Instruments
∆i3Mt -0.375** -0.377** -0.378** -0.293 -0.935*** -0.642*
(0.182) (0.171) (0.183) (0.186) (0.332) (0.376)
∆i3Mt−1 -0.106 -0.121 -0.106 -0.114 -0.172 -0.133
(0.146) (0.140) (0.145) (0.151) (0.234) (0.334)
∆i3Mt−2 -0.230 -0.293* -0.204 -0.187 0.218 0.468
(0.148) (0.158) (0.151) (0.150) (0.332) (0.382)
∆i3Mt−3 0.136 0.081 0.130 0.127 0.249 0.135
(0.094) (0.095) (0.093) (0.094) (0.243) (0.194)
∆i3Mt−4 -0.016 -0.022 0.020 0.028 -0.313 -0.300
(0.126) (0.127) (0.126) (0.125) (0.203) (0.222)
∆i10Yt -0.052 -0.066 -0.043 -0.049 0.046 -0.022
(0.086) (0.085) (0.087) (0.088) (0.113) (0.136)
∆i10Yt−1 -0.002 0.009 0.007 -0.021 0.075 0.034
(0.095) (0.092) (0.094) (0.096) (0.106) (0.115)
∆i10Yt−2 -0.068 -0.037 -0.069 -0.054 -0.158 -0.152
(0.110) (0.104) (0.108) (0.110) (0.130) (0.132)
∆i10Yt−3 0.023 0.030 0.038 0.023 -0.163 -0.107
(0.106) (0.100) (0.103) (0.106) (0.132) (0.139)
∆i10Yt−4 -0.098 -0.091 -0.090 -0.095 0.004 -0.029
(0.112) (0.110) (0.110) (0.114) (0.143) (0.159)
Cit−1 0.181 0.143 0.303 0.298 -0.068 -1.066
(0.183) (0.237) (0.216) (0.196) (0.890) (1.119)
Bit−1 -0.011 0.014 -0.006 0.035 -0.465*** -0.380*
(0.035) (0.044) (0.049) (0.037) (0.147) (0.198)
Sit−1 -0.020 -0.337 -0.036 -0.014 0.176* 0.102
(0.016) (0.251) (0.023) (0.020) (0.102) (0.076)
Cit−1 · yt -0.026 0.004 -0.034 -0.049 -0.081 0.485
(0.082) (0.079) (0.079) (0.076) (0.444) (0.551)
Cit−1 · yt−1 -0.086 -0.054 -0.081 -0.072 0.083 -0.396
(0.128) (0.117) (0.126) (0.126) (0.577) (0.698)
Cit−1 · yt−2 0.087 0.012 0.087 0.083 -0.948* -0.654
(0.162) (0.152) (0.156) (0.161) (0.503) (0.538)
Cit−1 · yt−3 0.079 0.098 0.074 0.065 1.238** 1.542**
(0.161) (0.151) (0.156) (0.160) (0.622) (0.629)
Cit−1 · yt−4 -0.081 -0.054 -0.084 -0.071 -0.482 -0.595
(0.083) (0.079) (0.082) (0.082) (0.381) (0.385)
Continued
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Table A2 cont’d: Estimated Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables OLS WG
GMM SYS t-2: GMM SYS t-3: GMM SYS t-2: GMM SYS t-3:
GMM-Style GMM-Style Stacked Stacked
Instruments Instruments Instruments Instruments
yt 0.068* 0.081** 0.060 0.061 0.139*** 0.101
(0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.054) (0.065)
yt−1 0.033 0.028 0.032 0.022 0.012 0.033
(0.051) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051) (0.069) (0.076)
yt−2 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 0.016 -0.007
(0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.074) (0.072)
yt−3 -0.007 0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.057 -0.067
(0.059) (0.057) (0.058) (0.060) (0.082) (0.090)
yt−4 0.055* 0.044 0.053* 0.044 0.085* 0.066
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.046) (0.051)
pit -0.091** -0.100** -0.081* -0.074* -0.202** -0.171**
(0.045) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.083) (0.074)
pit−1 0.034 0.029 0.019 0.021 0.180 0.164
(0.067) (0.063) (0.065) (0.067) (0.113) (0.111)
pit−2 -0.046 -0.059 -0.045 -0.046 -0.024 -0.047
(0.063) (0.058) (0.062) (0.064) (0.079) (0.090)
pit−3 -0.029 -0.020 -0.027 -0.019 -0.089 -0.059
(0.064) (0.061) (0.062) (0.064) (0.072) (0.083)
pit−4 -0.017 -0.037 -0.024 -0.014 -0.071 -0.029
(0.037) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) (0.050) (0.048)
Q2 0.074 0.077 0.074 0.074 0.003 0.011
(0.068) (0.061) (0.066) (0.069) (0.065) (0.071)
Q3 -0.083 -0.096 -0.081 -0.085 -0.066 -0.070
(0.072) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.085)
Q4 0.162** 0.132* 0.164** 0.161** 0.172** 0.152
(0.079) (0.075) (0.078) (0.080) (0.084) (0.100)
Constant 0.320*** 0.440*** 0.369*** 0.314*** 0.303* 0.253
(0.099) (0.093) (0.104) (0.100) (0.159) (0.188)
Regression Statistics:
Observations 2,898 2,898 2,898 2,898 2,898 2,898
R2 0.287 0.166 - - - -
Number of Groups - 93 93 93 93 93
AR(1) P-value - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) P-value - - 0.23 0.15 0.66 0.63
Sargan P-value - - 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
Hansen P-value - - 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96
Max # of lags - - 1-2 2-3 1-16 2-16
# of instruments - - 931 943 117 112
Notes : Dependent variable is the first difference of log quarterly loan volume, i.e. approximately the quarter on quarter loan growth
rate. Cluster robust standard errors, at bank-merger level, in parentheses. OLS stands for Ordinary Least Squares, WG stands for Within
Groups using the deviations from means transformation. GMM stands for Generalised Method of Moments. GMM is implemented
using both levels and first differenced equations (System GMM) as well as different instrument structures (GMM-Style or Stacked).
Column (3) uses GMM-style instruments and lags from t− 2 to t− 3. Column (4) uses GMM-style instruments and lags from t− 3 to
t− 4. Column (5) uses stacked instruments and lags from t− 2 up to t− 16 as instruments. Column (6) uses stacked instruments and
lags from t − 3 up to t − 16. All estimations in columns (2)-(6) use fixed effects that are adjusted to account for mergers in our data
set. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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A.3 Immediate vs. long-run effects
To clear up any ambiguity concerning the estimates of the immediate and long-run effects
reported in the paper, consider the following simplified version (suppressing fixed effects and
the error term) of our model,
∆ lnLit = α∆ lnLit−1 + β1xit , (8)
where x is equivalent to
(
ρit−1·∆it
EligCit−1
)
from equation (3). If we forward this model a couple of
periods:
∆ lnLit = α∆ lnLit−1 + β1xit
∆ lnLit+1 = α∆ lnLit + β1xit+1
∆ lnLit+2 = α∆ lnLit+1 + β1xit+2
∆ lnLit+3 = α∆ lnLit+2 + β1xit+3
∆ lnLit+4 = α∆ lnLit+3 + β1xit+4
After some substitution, we get:
∆ lnLit = α∆ lnLit−1 + β1xit
∆ lnLit+1 = α
2∆ lnLit−1 + β1xit+1 + αβ1xit
∆ lnLit+2 = α
3∆ lnLit−1 + β1xit+2 + αβ1xit+1 + α2β1xit
∆ lnLit+3 = α
4∆ lnLit−1 + β1xit+3 + αβ1xit+2 + α2β1xit+1 + α3β1xit
∆ lnLit+4 = α
5∆ lnLit−1 + β1xit+4 + αβ1xit+3 + α2β1xit+2 + α3β1xit+1 + α4β1xit
Notice that ∆it enters via the xit terms, which is particularly relevant for the ceteris paribus
exercise in section 4.2. Therefore, the immediate effect of xit on ∆ lnLit, is captured by
∂∆ lnLit
∂xit
= β1 , (9)
which is the effect of a contemporaneous change in xit on this quarter’s loan growth rate
∆ lnLit. The marginal effect of the change in xit on ∆ lnLit+1, i.e. after one quarter, is
∂∆ lnLit
∂xit−1
=
∂∆ lnLit+1
∂xit
= αβ1 .
In a similar fashion, the marginal change after s quarters is equal to
∂∆ lnLit
∂xit−s
=
∂∆ lnLit+s
∂xit
= αsβ1 .
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Note that |α| < 1, so as s→∞, αs → 0. The long-run effect we refer to is given by
∞∑
s=0
∂∆ lnLit+s
∂xit
=
∞∑
s=0
αsβ1 =
β1
1− α . (10)
Bear in mind that this is a simplified version of the actual calculation and is used for exposi-
tional purposes.
Figure 2 requires a set of calculations and values. The partial derivative of equation (3) with
respect to ∆i3Mt = ∆i
10Y
t = ∆it yields
∂∆ lnLit
∂∆it
= β1,0
(
ρ
EligC
)
+ β2,0B + β3,0C + β4,0 + β5,0 , (11)
which determines the immediate effect of an interest rate shock ∆it = 100 bp at time t in
Figure 2. The remaining punctual effects can be summarized by the following equations
∂∆ lnLit+1
∂∆it
= (β1,1 + αβ1,0)
(
ρ
EligC
)
+ (β2,1 + αβ2,0)B + (β3,1 + αβ3,0)C
+ [(β4,1 + β5,1) + α(β4,0 + β5,0)] , (12)
∂∆ lnLit+2
∂∆it
= (β1,2 + αβ1,1 + α
2β1,0)
(
ρ
EligC
)
+ (β2,2 + αβ2,1 + α
2β2,0)B
+ (β3,2 + αβ3,1 + α
2β3,0)C
+
[
(β4,2 + β5,2) + α(β4,1 + β5,1) + α
2(β4,0 + β5,0)
]
, (13)
∂∆ lnLit+3
∂∆it
= (β1,3 + αβ1,2 + α
2β1,1 + α
3β1,0)
(
ρ
EligC
)
+ (β2,3 + αβ2,2 + α
2β2,1 + α
3β2,0)B
+ (β3,3 + αβ3,2 + α
2β3,1 + α
3β3,0)C
+
[
(β4,3 + β5,3) + α(β4,2 + β5,2) + α
2(β4,1 + β5,1) + α
3(β4,0 + β5,0)
]
, (14)
∂∆ lnLit+4
∂∆it
= (β1,4 + αβ1,3 + α
2β1,2 + α
3β1,1 + α
4β1,0)
(
ρ
EligC
)
+ (β2,4 + αβ2,3 + α
2β2,2 + α
3β2,1 + α
4β2,0)B
+ (β3,4 + αβ3,3 + α
2β3,2 + α
3β3,1 + α
4β3,0)C
+
[
(β4,4 + β5,4) + α(β4,3 + β5,3) + α
2(β4,2 + β5,2) + α
3(β4,1 + β5,1) + α
4(β4,0 + β5,0)
]
.
(15)
The calculation of the cumulative long-run effect at time t+ 4 in Figure 2 is significantly more
algebraically involved. It requires the sum of equations (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15). Alterna-
tively, take the long-run coefficients displayed in Table 3, multiply them by their corresponding
average values reported in Table 10 and sum up.
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Finally, Table 10 summarizes the exact values that are needed for the calculations above
that are used in Figure 2. In order to perform the ceteris paribus analysis, we hold all other
factors constant and equal to their average value. Our main variable, interest rate risk exposure,
takes on three values determined by the distribution of upward interest rate risk in 2013Q3.
Table 10: Exact Values for Figure 2
Variable Exposure equal Average Bank Exposure equal
to 1. quartile to 3. quartile
Interest Rate Risk Exposure –1.32588 –4.30819 –7.18559
as a fraction of eligible capital (ρ/EligC)× 100
Normalized Excess Capital (C)× 100 –10.34936 –10.34936 –10.34936
Normalized Excess Liquidity (B)× 100 10.791 10.791 10.791
Short-term interest rate (∆i3M = ∆i = 1)× 100 100 bp 100 bp 100 bp
Long-term interest rate (∆i10Y = ∆i = 1)× 100 100 bp 100 bp 100 bp
Notes : All values correspond to 2013Q3. We recover the average values of normalized excess capital and liquidity in
lines 2 and 3 respectively. Importantly, we recover three values (25th percentile, average value, 75th percentile) of the
upward interest rate risk exposure distribution in 2013Q3 in the first line. The values have already been multiplied by
100, i.e. the 100 basis point increase in interest rates.
A.4 Asymmetric effects of gains and losses
In order to test the symmetry of the effects realized gains or losses on bank loan growth, we
define a binary variable,Asymmetry, which takes the value 1 if the effect of any ∆it is positive
and 0 if it is negative. The interaction with realized change in economic value picks up the
additional effect of realized gains.
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Definition of the Asymmetry Variable
Actual Interest Rate Change
∆it ≥ 0 ∆it < 0
Realized Interest Rate Risk Exposure
as a fraction of eligible capital
Upward Interest Rate Risk Exposure:
ρupit−1
EligCit−1
≥ 0 Positive effect
ρupit−1
EligCit−1
< 0 Negative effect
Downward Interest Rate Risk Exposure:
ρdownit−1
EligCit−1
≥ 0 Positive effect
ρdownit−1
EligCit−1
< 0 Negative effect
Notes : The positive/negative effects describe the ensuing impact of an actual interest rate
change on loan growth, via interest rate risk exposure. Note that ρup measures the exposure
if rates were to increase. Similarly, ρdown measures the exposure if rates were to decrease.
Using the definition of the binary variable, the specification takes on the following form:
∆ lnLit = β0 + α∆ lnLit−1
+
4∑
s=0
κ1,s
(
ρit−1 ×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it−s
+
4∑
s=0
κ2,s
(
ρit−1 ×∆it
EligCit−1
× Asymmetryt
)
it−s
+
4∑
s=0
β2,sBit−1 ×∆i3Mt−s +
4∑
s=0
β3,sCit−1 ×∆i3Mt−s
+
4∑
s=0
β4,s ∆i
3M
t−s +
4∑
s=0
β5,s ∆i
10Y
t−s
+ β6Bit−1 + β7Cit−1 + β8 Sit−1
+
4∑
s=0
β9,sCit−1 × yt−s +
4∑
s=0
β10,s yt−s +
4∑
s=0
β11,s pit−s
+
4∑
s=2
θs + µi + it , (16)
where, κgain = κ1,s + κ2,s measures the impact of a realized gain. The impact of a realized
loss is measured with κloss = κ1,s. The two-sided test of asymmetry works under the null of
H0 : κ
gain = κloss versus the alternative Ha : κgain 6= κloss. Therefore, rejecting the null would
support the thesis of the breakdown in symmetry. We estimate equation (16) and follow the
same procedure in calculating immediate and long-run effects, which yields the results found
in Table 4.
The null hypothesis of asymmetry of the immediate effects is recovered directly from test
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statistic on the estimated coefficient κˆ2,1, while the test statistic in the long-run requires a
comparison of the long-run realized gain effect and the long-run realized loss effect, using
an adapted version of (4).
A.5 Panel Bias Robustness
Table A5: Panel Bias Regression Comparisons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables T ≥ 10 T ≥ 15 T ≥ 20 All Panels
∆ lnLit−1 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.330***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it
1.824 1.800 1.937 2.020
(2.035) (2.036) (2.048) (2.031)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it−1
2.424 2.332 2.331 2.171
(2.721) (2.727) (2.738) (2.709)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it−2
-1.645 -1.551 -1.548 -1.189
(1.950) (1.954) (1.964) (1.953)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it−3
6.042*** 5.915*** 6.115*** 5.708***
(1.605) (1.602) (1.604) (1.567)(
ρit−1×∆it
EligCit−1
)
it−4
-1.071 -1.099 -1.115 -0.995
(1.590) (1.589) (1.607) (1.550)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt -0.068 -0.069 -0.064 -0.071
(0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt−1 0.073 0.073 0.069 0.075
(0.160) (0.160) (0.161) (0.159)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt−2 0.067 0.069 0.071 0.067
(0.176) (0.177) (0.177) (0.174)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt−3 -0.019 -0.021 -0.020 -0.024
(0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.118)
Bit−1 ·∆i3Mt−4 -0.105 -0.104 -0.104 -0.102
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.079)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt -0.070 -0.034 -0.036 -0.079
(0.256) (0.258) (0.260) (0.255)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt−1 0.115 0.134 0.114 0.112
(0.349) (0.353) (0.359) (0.348)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt−2 0.078 0.080 0.076 0.072
(0.352) (0.356) (0.359) (0.352)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt−3 0.039 0.049 0.033 0.038
(0.200) (0.201) (0.203) (0.204)
Cit−1 ·∆i3Mt−4 -0.503* -0.502* -0.516* -0.466
(0.293) (0.293) (0.303) (0.285)
Continued
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Table A5 cont’d: Panel Bias Regression Comparisons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables T ≥ 10 T ≥ 15 T ≥ 20 All Panels
∆i3Mt -0.393** -0.403** -0.396** -0.377**
(0.171) (0.172) (0.173) (0.171)
∆i3Mt−1 -0.097 -0.094 -0.086 -0.121
(0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.140)
∆i3Mt−2 -0.315** -0.305* -0.307* -0.293*
(0.157) (0.158) (0.160) (0.158)
∆i3Mt−3 0.090 0.087 0.095 0.081
(0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.095)
∆i3Mt−4 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.022
(0.128) (0.129) (0.130) (0.127)
∆i10Yt -0.051 -0.033 -0.033 -0.066
(0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.085)
∆i10Yt−1 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.009
(0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.092)
∆i10Yt−2 -0.028 -0.028 -0.026 -0.037
(0.104) (0.106) (0.107) (0.104)
∆i10Yt−3 0.024 0.027 0.028 0.030
(0.101) (0.102) (0.104) (0.100)
∆i10Yt−4 -0.085 -0.083 -0.077 -0.091
(0.111) (0.111) (0.113) (0.110)
Cit−1 0.139 0.179 0.163 0.143
(0.238) (0.240) (0.243) (0.237)
Bit−1 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.014
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Sit−1 -0.342 -0.335 -0.347 -0.337
(0.252) (0.253) (0.255) (0.251)
Cit−1 · yt 0.004 -0.008 0.002 0.004
(0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.079)
Cit−1 · yt−1 -0.052 -0.058 -0.072 -0.054
(0.117) (0.117) (0.120) (0.117)
Cit−1 · yt−2 0.002 0.025 0.037 0.012
(0.152) (0.155) (0.158) (0.152)
Cit−1 · yt−3 0.120 0.106 0.102 0.098
(0.153) (0.157) (0.160) (0.151)
Cit−1 · yt−4 -0.063 -0.066 -0.064 -0.054
(0.080) (0.082) (0.083) (0.079)
Continued
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Table A5 cont’d: Panel Bias Regression Comparisons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables T ≥ 10 T ≥ 15 T ≥ 20 All Panels
yt 0.079** 0.077** 0.077** 0.081**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
yt−1 0.029 0.034 0.032 0.028
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
yt−2 -0.015 -0.027 -0.022 -0.014
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052)
yt−3 0.009 0.018 0.015 0.011
(0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.057)
yt−4 0.043 0.040 0.040 0.044
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
pit -0.100** -0.102** -0.104** -0.100**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049)
pit−1 0.029 0.036 0.038 0.029
(0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063)
pit−2 -0.056 -0.060 -0.061 -0.059
(0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058)
pit−3 -0.025 -0.028 -0.022 -0.020
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061)
pit−4 -0.032 -0.030 -0.035 -0.037
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
Q2 0.075 0.079 0.082 0.077
(0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.061)
Q3 -0.098 -0.093 -0.090 -0.096
(0.070) (0.071) (0.073) (0.070)
Q4 0.125* 0.134* 0.138* 0.132*
(0.075) (0.076) (0.077) (0.075)
Constant 0.446*** 0.441*** 0.444*** 0.440***
(0.093) (0.094) (0.096) (0.093)
Regression Statistics:
Observations 2,869 2,830 2,785 2,898
R2 0.168 0.169 0.169 0.166
# of Groups 81 75 71 93
Notes : Dependent variable is the first difference of log quarterly loan volume,
i.e. approximately the quarter on quarter loan growth rate. Estimates using the
Within Groups deviations from means transformation. Cluster robust standard
errors, at bank-merger level, in parentheses. All estimations use fixed effects that
are adjusted to account for mergers in our data set. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
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A.6 Restricted Sample Period
Table A6: Robustness - Restricted Sample Period
Variables Immediate Long-Run
Realized Interest Rate Risk Exposure
(
ρit−1×∆i3Mt
EligCit−1
)
1.17 8.36
as a fraction of eligible capital (2.28) (5.26)
Norm. Excess Liquidity × ∆i3M –0.09 0.10
(0.11) (0.17)
Norm. Excess Capital × ∆i3M 0.04 0.02
(0.25) (1.08)
∆ Short-term interest rate (∆i3M) –0.54** –2.99***
(0.19) (0.82)
∆ Long-term interest rate (∆i10Y ) –0.19* –0.59
(0.11) (0.36)
Notes : Dependent variable is the first difference of log quarterly loan volume, i.e. ap-
proximately the quarter on quarter loan growth rate. Estimates using the Within Groups
transformation. All standard errors, in parentheses, are cluster robust at a bank-merger
level. Immediate effect standard errors are simply regression estimates. Long-run effect
standard errors are calculated using the delta-method. The long-run effects work under the
assumption that no adjustment takes place in other variables apart from bank loan growth.
In addition, the long-run estimates can be interpreted as approximate cumulative effects
over the next year. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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A.7 Additional Figures
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